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Absolute Pitch and Tone Identification
  Gilead Bar-Elli
Abstract
Absolute pitch (AP), besides the psychological and neurological
interests it has, raises some conceptual difficulties that can
teach us about the richness of our notion of musical tone and
various aspects of its identification. It is argued that when AP is
conceived under a slim notion of identifying the pitch of a
crude sound, it is hardly meaningful and has no significance in
music comprehension. The rich notion, which is the meaningful
and important one, involves knowing the position of a tone in a
tone-space and its relations. This is presented as experiential:
hearing and identifying tones under concepts and relations that
are experienced rather than figured out or derived on the basis
of crude identification of bare tones. Since many of these
concepts and relations are musically meaningful, this rich
notion of identification is thus connected to musical
understanding and aesthetic appreciation of a musical work.  It
may also be claimed to be vital in passing between different
sense modalities, and can explain various aspects of AP and
puzzles connected with it.
Key Words 
experiential knowledge, identifying tones, music
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1. Absolute pitch: some introductory remarks
Absolute pitch, or AP, sometimes called perfect pitch, is often
characterized as the ability to immediately identify, without
external aid, the pitch of a heard tone.[1] Sometimes this goes
together with the ability to immediately identify the pitches of
tones comprising a heard chord. I shall concentrate here on the
former. Some researchers distinguish between an active and a
passive AP. The above characterization applies to the latter. An
active AP is the ability to immediately produce, for example, in
singing or whistling, the exact pitch of a note identified by a
name or sign.[2] AP is distinguished from relative pitch, which
is the ability to identify the pitch of a tone relative to another,
given one. Relative pitch, which can be learned and cultivated,
is considered a central musical ability whose importance in
music comprehension is unquestioned while that of AP is.
The ontological categorization of tones besets serious
problems, on which there is recently a rapidly growing
literature. Tones are often considered a subcategory of sounds
and sounds have been argued to be objects, qualities,
secondary qualities, events, event-sources, and more.[3] There
are important issues involved here but I shall not delve into
them, as they would detract from the main subject of this
paper. Rather, I shall talk of identifying tones as a special
instance of identifying objects, in the very general and loose
sense of the term, in which it is whatever is the object of
identification. This wide and general sense of identification is a
key notion in our perception and thinking. We identify persons,
places, colors, numbers, sounds, shapes, looks, and so on.
Some are individuals, some are universals, some are
particulars, some are properties, some are concrete, and some
are abstract. In each of these it seems that different criteria
are employed in ascribing the ability of correct
identification.[4]
This variety and the general use of "identification" over it raise
problems beyond the problems that pertain to each of its
members. I shall leave these aside here, for my aim is not
strictly ontological. There is, however, a feature that pertains
to many of these cases that is relevant to the identification of
tones and has a more general significance, which is that the
criteria we employ in identifying objects often have to do with
our surrounding knowledge about the object concerned. It
seems as though we wish, and need, to keep the distinction
between the very identifying of something and our knowledge
about it. This may lead to minimizing the amount of knowledge
we should require as a prerequisite for identification and, in the
extreme, to reach a "crude identification" of a "bare object."
The theory of bare objects, or bare particulars, has come under
heavy criticism, at least since the mid-twentieth century.
Objects are always presented to us imbued with propositional
knowledge, and their identification thus appears to be much
more conceptual than the crude conception portrays. One
important route for keeping the above distinction in a way that
allows for understanding the relationship between its two sides
is to regard identifying an object as always identifying it under
a concept or in a system of concepts. This, though still not
propositional knowledge, is yet conceptual and may pave a
way to understanding the relationship between identifying an
object and knowledge about it.[5]
I shall not delve here into these heavy waters but focus on one
example of it, which seems to me neat and illuminating, the
possession of absolute pitch and the identification of pitched
tones involved in it. As a common conception of AP, it comes
as close as any to the crude identification of an object, that is,
the AP of a bare tone, irrespective of its properties and
relations to other tones or to the musical context. I shall argue
against this conception, and claim that the identification of
tones involved in AP is a rich notion, in which a tone is
identified in a system of concepts and relations. On the way to
substantiating this and sharpening our intuitions regarding it, I
shall briefly allude to some other cases of rich identification
and present some puzzles of AP, in which the rich conception of
identification seems crucial to their solutions. This, if correct,
supports the general view that the notion of identifying tones
involved in AP is a conceptually rich one, and from that we may
learn more generally about other cases of identification.[6]
Needless to say, hearing tones under concepts and the rich
notion of identifying tones are essential to music
comprehension and thus lie at the basis of understanding
music and its aesthetic appreciation.
Much in the above characterization of AP is obscure and raises
a host of problems. Some of them concern empirical issues, on
which much research has been carried out and some important
findings obtained.[7] We shall leave these aside and
concentrate on one of a conceptual character, which is what is
meant by "identifying" a tone in these formulations?
There seem to be three main criteria for correct identification
of tones: labeling, memory judgments, and ability to
reproduce. Each raises problems of its own, but in relation to
all three I argue below that when conceived under a slim
notion of the ability to label a heard tone, or perform some
memory-tasks with it, or reproduce it, detached from some
basic knowledge regarding it, they all are inapt for
identification as involved in AP and, in fact, are hardly
intelligible. On the other hand, all three do fine when conceived
under a rich notion fused with concepts and relations
pertaining to the tone identified.
2. The singing/playing discrepancy (SPD)
We shall start with a little puzzle about the third and most
common criterion. A common criterion for AP, that is, for
identifying the pitch of a tone, is the ability to immediately
match or reproduce the pitch of a heard tone, say, on an
instrument one knows how to play. However, in showing this
ability, there is a great difference between the means of
reproduction. Most people can easily repeat a heard tone, or
even a short melodic phrase, by singing or whistling in the
correct pitch. This ability is very common and is not considered
evidence for AP. However, many of them will be unable to do it
on an instrument they know how to play. An ability to do this,
even when they don't know the names of the notes they are
playing, is considered evidence for AP. Why? What is the root
of the difference? If the ability to repeat a heard tone or phrase
on a flute or violin is a sign of its identification and evidence for
AP, why is repeating it by singing not regarded as manifesting
such identification? It seems to me that any serious account of
AP, and of the identification involved in it, must address this
problem and also related ones, some of which will be
mentioned below, which we shall call the singing/playing
discrepancy (SPD).[8]
It should be noted that we don't seem to have a similar
discrepancy with regard to speaking and writing. It seems that
a proficient writer or typist can write or type a heard word or
phrase, even when perceived phonetically, without
understanding it, with more or less the same ease in which he
or she can repeat it in speaking. Rhythm also does not beset
such a discrepancy. We can easily repeat a heard rhythm with
our mouth or hands or an instrument. The discrepancy,
however, is vast as it relates to the ability to repeat, in the
correct pitch, a heard tone or short melody in singing as
compared to playing. Why? To this problem we can add a small
addendum. In reading music notes, the relation seems to be
the opposite. An experienced player can play seen notes on an
instrument quite easily, directly, and naturally, while singing
them requires a special skill (solfeggio), and singing them in
the correct pitch requires AP. Why is that so?
It seems that the answer surely has to do with our experience,
perhaps in early childhood, and with our learning to speak,
which surely involves imitations of various sorts. But this is too
general. It should be noticed that we usually have very little
experience in matching, imitating, or reproducing pitch. Neither
are we normally required or encouraged to do so. Further,
even assuming that sometimes we do imitate or match pitch,
as in singing, this must involve identifying what is thus
imitated or matched. Hence,  some notion of identification is
involved in matching or imitating the pitch of a heard sound
also in singing. Why, then, isn't that considered evidence for
AP? So, if experience can account for SPD, it must be in a very
complicated and roundabout way. We still need to be more
specific on what is involved.
Roughly, the answer we shall propose is rooted in the notion of
identification alluded to above, which, as exemplified in AP, I
shall argue, is a conceptually rich one. The tone is identified as
belonging to a tonal space, bearing specific relations, including
metrical ones, to other tones. Repeating a tone or phrase by
singing or whistling seems to us natural and direct in a way
that does not require the mediation of such rich identification
of the tones concerned. To the extent it involves identifying the
tones, in this respect it is what we shall call slim identification.
Doing it on an instrument, on the other hand, does require
such identifying mediation. What the nature and role of such
mediatory identification is, and what "natural" means here, are
not easy questions, to some aspects of which we shall return
later. If correct, even in its general line, this answer supports
the view that identifying tones, as exercised in manifestations
of AP, is conceptually rich; it is identifying them under a rich
network of concepts.
In its regular use, identifying a tone does not mean only being
able to repeat it or to attach a name or a label to it. These are
not only not necessary, but also not sufficient. Identifying a
tone involves also knowing its position and role in a certain
system or space of tones, their properties and relations, such
as, some intervals, scales, basic chords, and harmonic
functions. This, as we shall see below, is true of many other
cases of identification, even those involved in manifesting AP.
 For example, where pianists are concerned, it applies also to
knowing special places and spatial relations on the keyboard,
or, for violinists, on strings. Such knowledge may be regarded
as part of what identifying a note-key on the piano, or a
position on the string, means.
3. Examples of rich and slim Identification
In order to clarify this, let us think of the following example.
Imagine someone who, when seeing a box of matches spread
on the table and asked how many they are, says immediately
fifty-seven, and, with another box, sixty-five. Suppose both are
correct, and that this is also the case in many other instances.
However, when asked which box contains more matches, or
which of the numbers is bigger, our savant hasn't an idea of
what is asked for, or gives correct and wrong answers at
random. Would we say the savant identified the numbers of
matches? I think we would not, as knowing that the first box
contained less matches than the second seems a necessary
condition for ascribing him such identification; or, at least we
should distinguish between a slim and a rich notion of
identification, where in its regular use identification is fairly
rich.
I leave "fairly rich" in its vagueness, for it is obviously hard to
tell, in advance, which of the infinitely many mathematical
relations between these two numbers he or she should know.
This is something we would usually determine according to
specific aims and other pragmatic factors of the situation. But
for our regular notion of identifying numbers, one should
evidently know some, like that sixty-five is bigger than fifty-
seven, that it is the following natural number of sixty-four, and
so on. Slim or crude identification is identification with minimal
conceptualization, where "minimal" is again left rather vague.
It can be manifested, for example, in pointing at "the object
out there," or in mere labeling, as in uttering "fifty-seven" in
the above example. With regard to tones, it can be manifested
by uttering a name or a label like "middle D," "F," or even in
specifying a wave length like "245 Herz." According to a
common, and by now perhaps outmoded, conception, any
identification is based on a crude identification to which a
concept may be attached. I find this wrong and try to
demonstrate it with the case of AP.
Likewise, we should distinguish between a slim and a rich
notion of identification in many other cases, including that
involved in AP. In spite of the fact that we can think of criteria
for a crude identification of the pitch of a sound as an acoustic
phenomenon, for example, in uttering a label, or in matching it
or repeating it in singing or whistling, when such identification
is slim and detached from knowing the relevant space of
relations, it is very doubtful whether we would regard it as
identifying a tone in the fairly rich sense required. On the other
hand, it is evident that knowing this space, with its properties
and relations, is not sufficient for the identification concerned.
It is nevertheless important to bear in mind that these
conditions, not being sufficient, are still relevant and perhaps
necessary for the identification concerned. It should be noted
that rich identification, involving as it does knowledge of
various concepts and relations, is still identification of a
particular, a tone, a number, and so on. It is rich in that what
is identified is not a bare sound, not even a particular pitch,
but is conceived under these concepts and relations. This is
what slim identification lacks.[9]
These considerations about the nature of the identification
concerned are connected with a central problem in the
philosophy of music and its ontology, namely, what is the
nature of (musical) tones. We shall not discuss this here but
point out that a musical tone, to be distinguished from mere
sound, is conceptually rich. It is not a crude acoustic event but
an acoustic event, under a particular description that expresses
the concepts in which the tone is conceived and relegates it to
a tonal space in which it is conceived. By this I mean that the
concepts and relations concerned, which may vary from one
musical culture to another, do not form a super-structure
imposed on a given array of bare tones but are, rather,
constitutive of the tones and their identity.
Some philosophers might express this by saying it is an
intensional entity.[10] The claim made here about the
conceptual richness of the identification of tones squares with
this intensional conception of tones. This notion of rich
identification of tones is very important, in fact, crucial, for
music comprehension, understanding, and evaluating musical
pieces. These always involve concepts and hearing under
concepts, even when people are unaware of it and don't know
the customary names for these concepts. Some are technical,
like phrase, period, tonic, dominant, inverse, stretto, and so
on, while some are more general, like tension and relaxation,
movement, peak, and so on.
Many people ascribe to AP much significance in musical activity
and music comprehension and education. Many musicians
possess it, and the rate of people with AP among musicians is
much higher than in the general population, which is about
1:10,000. It is quite certain that up to a certain, and good,
degree, AP is an acquirable ability, and the likelihood of
acquiring it, with moderate training, up to the age of about
nine is good and much higher than later on. Currently, there
are courses and books devoted to teaching and bringing music
students to acquire AP.  Many of the great composers had AP,
and many professional performers and musicians have it.[11]
From all this it seems that there is a strong connection
between AP and musical talent. On the other hand, besides the
fact that many excellent musicians don’t posses AP, it is
claimed that the rate of people having AP among speakers of
tone-language, such as Mandarin Chinese and some others, in
which the pitch of a spoken word or phoneme is semantically
significant, is especially high.[12] This has nothing to do with
musicality, but the linguistic phenomenon, not less than the
musical one, is a case of rich identification, in which the
identified particulars are conceived in a system of concepts and
relations.
4. AP and experiencing concepts and relations
My central claim in this connection is that AP, when conceived
with a slim notion of identification of a crude tone, detached
from the tone-space and its relations, if meaningful at all, is
insignificant for music comprehension and may even be a
hindrance to it.[13] In order to see this and the significance of
“in itself” in the above formulation, let us sharpen and enhance
the above consideration about slim identification. Consider
someone having slim AP but being interval deaf. Upon hearing
the notes C-E and G-B, he or she is unable to hear and to
experience it as the same interval. He or she might say it is the
same interval and respond appropriately to various tasks but
will not hear it. He or she can perhaps figure it out or derive it
on the basis of identifying the four tones and knowing some
elementary theory, and then figuring out that these must have
been two instances of a major third, but will not hear it. His or
her responses to it will differ, perhaps being slower, from
responses to things he or she hears.[14] But evidently, such
hearing and experiencing are what is important for music
comprehension and understanding: to hear and to experience
the identity of the interval, not to calculate it or derive it from
other things one hears.
This might be likened to someone having an absolute sense of
length or height. On seeing an object, such as a person, tree,
house, and so on, a person can immediately say its height. We
can imagine, however, that such a savant will not see height or
length relations. He or she will not be able to see that A is
higher or longer than B. He will see A, and B, know
immediately their heights, and then derive or figure out that
the one is higher than the other by knowing that A is, say, 1.87
meters and B is 1.76, and knowing that the first number is
bigger than the second. I think we would all agree that
something is defective in his or her sight – he or she doesn't
see what we do – though he or she can respond correctly and
behave generally like us.
We can likewise imagine something similar with respect to
colors. Most of us seem to have an "absolute sight" of some
colors. Imagine someone who identifies colors well but cannot
see, for example, that yellow is brighter than blue. He or she
can figure it out by identifying the colors and knowing some
theory about colors but cannot see and feel it. I think we
should say that such a person’s visual perception is different
from ours and doubt whether he or she sees, for example, a
Kandinsky's picture as we do.[15]
Likewise, our interval deaf person can hardly be said to hear
music; definitely not like us. In fact, he or she will also not
hear, upon our playing twice C-E, that this is the same interval.
He or she won't even understand our question whether he or
she hears the same interval. Again, such a person may figure it
out by identifying, in a slim way, the four notes separately but
not hear the intervals. He or she can hardly, therefore, be said
to have our notion of an interval. More than that, we can
imagine this person not being able to identify a tone; he or she
may not hear the tonal identity of two tokens of the same
tone. Upon hearing middle C twice, he or she will not hear it as
the same tone but derive it or figure it out by identifying each
as middle C.
This difference between experiencing, for example, tone-
intervals, color relations, height relations, and so on, and
calculating them is an instance of the above distinction
between identifying-under-concepts and knowing about. Tones
are conceived and identified under concepts and relations as
involved in hearing, for example, intervals. They are not
crudely identified as bare objects, which is then somehow
attached to knowledge about them. And what we have said
about intervals is true of actually most musical concepts. We
can imagine someone with AP who is unable to hear tonality,
though he or she may figure it out or derive it on the basis of
some theoretical knowledge from identifying the tones. He or
she would not hear harmonic relations like the one between
tonic and dominant, would not hear the difference between a
consonance and a dissonance and various kinds of musical
tension, and would not hear modulations, cadences,
sequences, transpositions, and so on.[16] All these he or she
may figure out or calculate by identifying tones but not hear
them or experience them.[17]
But, to repeat, such hearing and experiencing is what hearing
music is all about. One who is deprived of this does not hear
music, in the normal sense, and does not experience it, though
he or she may know, by way of figuring out and deriving, much
of what we know. Having said all that, we must re-emphasize
that when AP involves rich identification, this is not confined to
perceiving relations like the above but is identifying the tones
themselves under some concepts and relations. So, with such
AP one does not only hear, for example, a major third but
identifies the tones comprising it.
We have brought these various thought-experiments of
deafness in order to sharpen and emphasize important factors
of our musical hearing, of which the deaf concerned is
deprived. AP, in the slim sense of identifying a crude tone, is
compatible with these kinds of deafness. In fact, it is not very
different from the ability to identify music notes on paper. And
here, as there, we can imagine such an ability to be detached
from solfeggio ability, from any ability to fancy or know how
the notes concerned would sound. Such crude identifying
ability is possessed at a certain stage, by any kid beginning to
read notes. He or she sees a note, a sign on a stave, and says
C, sees another note and says E, and so on. We can imagine
him or her at this stage to know nothing about how the notes
would sound, how would the interval between them sound,
which one would sound higher, and so on. Such a kid,
supposing him or her to be especially bright and
knowledgeable, may figure out these things, may figure out
which tone is higher, how is the interval between them called,
when such intervals are equal, and so on. But by our
supposition, he or she will not experience these, will not have
an "inner hearing" of them, and will not know how they should
sound.[18] In principle, AP, in the slim, crude sense of
identification, is no different from such identification of notes
except that instead of the eyes one uses the ears.
Let me emphasize again that these things are not meant to be
true of persons with AP and of their musical experiences. Their
aim is, rather, conceptual: to reduce the slim, crude sense of
identification and a notion of AP based on this to the point of
absurdity, in which it looks inappropriate and hardly intelligible,
in order to sharpen and bring to the fore essential elements of
our notion of a musical tone and of musical hearing and music
comprehension. Chief among them are the following: 1) The
recognition that a musical tone and its identification are rich
concepts involving experiential knowledge of its location and
status in a tone-space with its properties and relations; and 2)
The recognition that hearing and comprehending music consist
in hearing and experiencing, as opposed to figuring out,
calculating, and deriving, the musical concepts and relations
concerned. AP, under the rich notion of identification, can
accompany and even enhance this but is not necessary for it.
Under a slim notion of identification, if intelligible at all, AP is
neither necessary nor sufficient for it, and hardly relevant.
These considerations support the general philosophical view
that it is a mistake to conceive of perceptual identification as
crude identification of a particular plus derived knowledge
about it. It is, rather, identification of the particular under or in
a system of concepts experienced by the identifier. I cannot
indulge here in a detailed discussion of what identifying
something under a concept is but will just express my hope
that the above considerations show that it need not be
identifying a bare “it” plus applying the concept to it.
Therefore, I don't think that the rich concept is necessarily built
on the slim one. Moreover, the rich notion of identification,
with the experiencing and feeling of the concepts and relations
involved, whether technical musical ones or more general,
common ones, as explained above, is directly connected to the
expressiveness of music and to the aesthetic appreciation of a
piece of music as a piece of art.
5. SPD and sense modalities
On the basis of the above considerations, we may come back
to the SPD problem posed above, why singing, or whistling, a
heard tone is easy and not considered evidence of AP while
repeating it on an instrument is. I suggested, in brief, that the
latter involves and depends on a rich identification of the tone
that the former does not. As noted above, one may still protest
that the former also involves some kind of identification,
exactly that which is expressed by matching or repeating the
tone in singing. One may go even further and ask what does
identification have to do with the difficulty at question? In
response, let me emphasize again that the gist of the above
considerations is that our regular notions of a musical tone and
of identifying tones are rich concepts that involve perceiving
tones in a system of properties and relations, including even
sort of a metrics over the tones, for example the regular
diatonic system. The difficulty in repeating a tone or phrase in
another system, in another medium, such as the spatial
dimensions of the piano keyboard, is therefore a difficulty in
mapping this system into the new medium. This is why the rich
notion of identification is required here, and this is why passing
between them may be difficult. In singing, on the other hand,
it is doubtful whether there is such mapping, and even if there
is, the relevant system is so close to the one involved in
hearing, and the congruence between them is so readily
accessible, that we hardly feel a difficulty in passing from one
to the other, and identification in the rich sense is therefore not
required.
Perceptual or sense modality is also important here, especially
the difference between hearing and seeing. When the two
systems, the origin and the target, are both seen, the
congruence between them may be readily accessible.
Therefore, assuming that passing between the two involves
some sort of mapping, it is relatively easy. This can explain
why, for a trained pianist, playing on the piano from a score,
that is, repeating on the piano what is seen in the score, is
relatively easy in comparison with playing what is heard, and
does not require AP. The score and the piano keyboard are
both spatial systems, and the congruence between them is
easily mastered. Passing between them does not require AP. A
kid beginning to learn to play the piano learns to map the
visual notational system to the visual spatial system of the
keyboard.  Although this evidently involves some sort of
identification, as he may even know the names of the notes, it
has nothing to do with AP and with the identification involved
in it.
On the other hand, hearing a tone or a melody is a different
perceptual modality, and heard tones form a system whose
congruence with the spatial one of the keyboard is much
harder to grasp and less accessible. Since such passing, say,
between heard tones and the piano keyboard or the notational
system involves the mapping of systems, it requires a rich
notion of identification and the corresponding AP. Likewise, this
can explain why singing from a score in the correct pitch is
difficult and may require AP. For whatever the sense modality
of sung tones is, it is probably very different from the seen
notational system. By the same token, repeating in singing a
heard tone or phrase need not require AP, for it involves
mapping closely congruent systems in the same or in very
close perceptual modalities.[19]
SPD and its related problems indicated above, and the
distinction between the slim and the rich notions of
identification of tones alluded to above, are apparently
different issues, each calling for explanation in any serious
treatment of AP. They both stand on their own merits
independent of our speculation about the sense-modalities and
their relative congruence, even if this speculation is rejected.
This speculation, however, has the merit of connecting them in
suggesting that the latter is a clue to the former.      
6. Conclusion
We may conclude our discussion by saying that the
tone-identification involved in AP has two characteristic facets.
1) It is not crude identification of the pitch of a tone as an
acoustic phenomenon but a rich concept in which a tone is
perceived in a tone-space with its properties and relations. 2)
It is manifested in the ability to pass between different sense
modalities, in particular, seeing and hearing, that is, in the
ability to map, in an easily accessible way, the heard tone-
system into the visual spatial one. Identification in the same
sense modality, or in close ones, may not depend on such rich
identification and is therefore not evidence of AP. But let it be
noticed again that, be the case with SPD and its explanation
what it may, the main point about AP involving a rich notion of
identification remains. The hypothesis about SPD gives it
support but it is not dependent on this hypothesis.
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End Notes
[1] I shall use "tone" for a heard sound and "note" for a
customary sign for it.
[2] Pitch, along with volume, timbre and duration, is often
presented as a property of tones. This may be misleading in
many ways, but even if one chooses to talk this way, it should
be noticed that pitch is an essential property of tones, or that
tones supervene on their pitches, in a way that timbre,
volume, and duration do not. Change of pitch, unless very
slight, is change of tone, while change of volume, even when
significant, is not. I shall therefore not be strict on
distinguishing identifying tones from identifying their pitch.
This also accords with the way musicians usually talk of tone-
identification.
[3] A very useful compilation on this, with a helpful
introduction, is M. Nudds and C. O'Callaghan, Sounds &
Perception (Oxford, 2009).
[4] Readers familiar with P. Strawson's Individuals (Methuen,
1959) should notice that I am not concerned with identifying,
or re-identifying,  tones as particulars in his sense. Tones in
my use are closer to his universals or "thin particulars" (see,
for example, p. 70, and the whole of chapter 2); and even
more so to Scruton's "secondary objects;" see chapters 1 and
2 of his The Aesthetics of Music (Oxford, 1997).
[5] I personally like to think of it in the context of a Fregean
theory of sense, and prefer talking there of "identifying under a
sense," for, evidently "concept" is not used here in the Fregean
sense. But I shall not pursue this here.
[6] In recent researches it has been found that super-
recognizers, who show fantastic abilities in identifying faces, do
about normal when shown faces in inverted positions. See R.
Russell, B. Duchaine, K. Nakayama, "Super-recognizers: People
with Extraordinary Face Recognition Ability," Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review,2009, 16 (2) 252-257. This is not strictly
relevant to our case of AP, but in a remote way it may support
the claim that the pertinent notions of identification are imbued
with a conceptual framework. Super-recognizers identify faces
given as such, as faces in their normal position, and when
inverted or distorted they lose this face-aspect.
[7] On some of the empirical findings and speculations, see:
D.J. Levitin & W.E. Rogers, "Absolute Pitch: Perception, Coding
and Controversies," Trends in Cognitive Science, vol, 9 no. 1,
(January, 2005). On some aspects of the relationship between
AP and memory, see also, Judy Plantinga and Laurel J. Trainor,
"Infants' Memory for Isolated Tones and the Effects of
Interference," Music Perception, Vol. 26, No. 2, (December,
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